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Cultural Cognition and Public Policy 
Dan M. Kahan† and Donald Braman†† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Our concern in this Essay is to explain the epistemic origins of political 
conflict. Citizens who agree that the proper object of law is to secure society’s 
material well-being are still likely to disagree—intensely—about what policies 
will achieve that end as an empirical matter. Does the death penalty deter 
homicides, or instead inure people to lethal violence? Would stricter gun 
control make society safer, by reducing the incidence of crime and gun 
accidents, or less safe, by hampering the ability of individuals to defend 
themselves from predation? What threatens our welfare more—environmental 
pollution or the economic consequences of environmental protection laws? 
What exacts a bigger toll on public health and productivity—the distribution of 
street drugs or the massive incarceration of petty drug offenders? 
At first glance, it might seem that such disagreement doesn’t really require 
much explanation. Figuring out the empirical consequences of criminal, 
environmental, and other regulatory laws is extremely complicated. Scientists 
often disagree about such matters. Moreover, even when expert consensus 
seems to emerge, it is based on highly technical forms of proof that most 
members of the public can’t realistically be expected to understand, much less 
verify for themselves. So citizens disagree about the empirical dimensions of 
various public policy questions because conclusive information about the 
consequences of such policies is either nonexistent or inaccessible to them. 
But it turns out that this explanation is as simplistic as it is intuitive. If the 
source of public dispute about the empirical consequences of public policy 
were based on the indeterminacy or inaccessibility of scientific knowledge, 
than we would expect beliefs about these consequences either to be randomly 
distributed across the population or to be correlated with education. But this is 
not so: Factual disagreement on matters such as the death penalty, 
environmental protection laws, gun control and the like is highly polarized 
across distinct social groups—racial, sexual, religious, regional, and 
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ideological.1 Such divisions persist even after education is controlled for; 
indeed, they have been shown to characterize differences of opinion even 
among experts who specialize in the methods necessary for establishing the 
empirical consequences of public policies.2 
Moreover, were indeterminacy or inaccessibility of scientific knowledge 
the source of public disagreement, we would expect beliefs on discrete issues to 
be uncorrelated with each other. Accepting one empirical claim or another 
about gun control, for example, doesn’t give someone more or less reason to 
believe one position or another about global warming. Yet in fact, factual 
beliefs on these and many other seemingly unrelated issues do cohere. If 
someone believes that gun control doesn’t deter gun violence, he is very likely 
to believe that global warming poses no serious environmental risk, and that 
abortion clearly puts the health of women in danger; if she believes that gun 
control does deter crime, she’s likely to think that global warming is a serious 
problem, and that abortion isn’t dangerous to a woman’s health.3 
Patterns like these don’t occur by chance. There is some phenomenon—
other than the paucity or inaccessibility of scientific information—that shapes 
the distribution of factual beliefs about, and the existence of political conflict 
over, law and public policy. What is it? 
The answer, we propose, is a set of processes we call cultural cognition. 
Essentially, cultural commitments are prior to factual beliefs on highly charged 
political issues. Culture is prior to facts, moreover, not just in the evaluative 
sense that citizens might care more about how gun control, the death penalty, 
environmental regulation and the like cohere with their cultural values than 
they care about the consequences of those policies. Rather, culture is prior to 
facts in the cognitive sense that what citizens believe about the empirical 
consequences of those policies derives from their cultural worldviews. Based 
on a variety of overlapping psychological mechanisms, individuals accept or 
reject empirical claims about the consequences of controversial polices based 
on their vision of a good society. 
This account has important prescriptive as well as positive implications. If 
one starts with the intuitive but mistaken premise that public disagreement is an 
 
1. On the death penalty, see Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: 
Americans’ Views on the Death Penalty, 50 J. SOC. ISSUES 19 (1994); and Samuel R. Gross, Update: 
American Public Opinion on the Death PenaltyIt’s Getting Personal, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1448 
(1998). On environmental risk regulation, see PAUL SLOVIC, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics and Science: 
Surveying the Risk-Assessment Battlefield, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 390-412 (2000). On gun control, 
see TOM W. SMITH, 1999 NATIONAL GUN POLICY SURVEY OF THE NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH 
CENTER: RESEARCH FINDINGS (2000), http://www.norc.uchicago.edu/online/gunrpt.pdf. 
2. See, e.g., SLOVIC, supra note 1, at 396. 
3. See Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic & C. K. Mertz, Gender, Race, and 
Risk Perception: The Influence of Cultural Status Anxiety 15-24 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 86, 2005), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=723762. 
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artifact of insufficient or insufficiently accessible scientific information, the 
obvious strategy for dispelling disagreement, and for promoting enlightened 
democratic decisionmaking, is to produce and disseminate sound information 
as widely as possible. But the phenomenon of cultural cognition implies that 
this strategy will be futile. In determining whether empirical information on 
gun control, on the death penalty, on environmental regulation, on social 
deviance, and the like is sound, individuals will inevitably be guided by their 
cultural evaluations of these activities. 
Our point isn’t that citizens behave duplicitously when they consider and 
debate such issues. Rather, our argument is that cultural commitments operate 
as a kind of heuristic in the rational processing of information on public policy 
matters. Again, citizens aren’t in a position to figure out through personal 
investigation whether the death penalty deters, gun control undermines public 
safety, commerce threatens the environment, et cetera. They have to take the 
word of those whom they trust on issues of what sorts of empirical claims, and 
what sorts of data supporting such claims, are credible. The people they trust, 
naturally, are the ones who share their values—and who as a result of this same 
dynamic and others are predisposed to a particular view. As a result, even 
citizens who earnestly consider empirical policy issues in an open-minded and 
wholly instrumental way will align themselves into warring cultural factions. 
Nothing in this account implies either that there is no empirical truth of the 
matter on public policy issues or that citizens can’t ever be expected to see it. 
But in order to persuade members of the public to accept empirically sound 
information, it is necessary to do more than merely make such information 
available to them. Like many other heuristics, the cultural cognition of public 
policy can impede the rational processing of information. But like at least some 
other heuristics, its influence can be neutralized with appropriate debiasing 
techniques. The key to debiasing here is to frame empirical information in 
terms that make assent to it compatible with, rather than antagonistic to, the 
commitments of individuals of diverse cultural persuasions. 
The remainder of this Essay expands on these claims. In Part II, we offer a 
schematic overview of cultural cognition, identifying its foundations in 
anthropology and social psychology. In Part III, we summarize existing 
empirical evidence of the impact of cultural cognition. Part IV makes a short 
detour, assessing how the phenomenon of cultural cognition relates to the 
concepts of ideology and cultural political conflict. Parts V and VI examine the 
normative and prescriptive implications of cultural cognition. And Part VII 
concludes. 
II. CULTURAL COGNITION: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
By “the cultural cognition of public policy” (or simply “cultural 
cognition”), we mean to refer to the psychological disposition of persons to 
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conform their factual beliefs about the instrumental efficacy (or perversity) of 
law to their cultural evaluations of the activities subject to regulation. Our 
hypothesis that individuals display such a disposition rests on the intersection 
of two bodies of social science research, one in the field of anthropology and 
the other in the field of social psychology. 
The work in anthropology on which we draw is associated with Mary 
Douglas. In her classic work Purity and Danger,4 Douglas traced the 
identification of the idea of “pollution” with the “unholy” or immoral in 
primitive religions. “[L]aws of nature,” she wrote, “are dragged in to sanction 
the moral code.”5 Adultery, incest, the confusion of sexual functions and roles, 
various acts of political disloyalty or disrespect for authority—all are viewed 
not merely as impious but as dangerous. They naturally spawn the outbreak of 
contagious disease within the community at large, the occurrence of 
devastating natural disasters, the dampening of human fertility, and the like. 
“[P]rimitives expect their rites to have external efficacy”6—they are committed 
to the norms that regulate social orderings as much, if not more, for 
“instrumental” reasons as for “expressive” ones.7 
It is conventional to view this feature of primitive religions as a product of 
the role that superstition necessarily plays in lieu of natural science within 
premodern societies. But a second theme of Purity and Danger is that the 
equation of pollution or danger with deviancy is no less present among modern 
societies, a point Douglas famously established by showing how intertwined 
our own conceptions of “dirt,” and our resulting sensibilities of revulsion and 
disgust, are to the “contravention” of “ordered relations”: 
Shoes are not dirty in themselves, but it is dirty to place them on the dining-table; 
food is not dirty in itself, but it is dirty to leave cooking utensils in the bedroom, or 
food bespattered on clothing; similarly, bathroom equipment in the drawing room; 
clothing lying on chairs; out-door things in-doors; upstairs things downstairs; under-
clothing appearing where over-clothing should be . . . .8 
Our perception of what is “dirty,” and what thus poses a source of potentially 
unhygienic and hazardous contamination, Douglas wrote, “is [a] reaction which 
condemns any object or idea likely to confuse or contradict cherished 
classifications.”9 
This theme—that modern sensibilities and perceptions of danger are 
artifacts of our commitment to distinctive cultural orderings—is even more 
systematically developed in Douglas’s Risk and Culture,10 co-authored with 
 
4. MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER (1966). 
5. Id. at 3. 
6. Id. at 58. 
7. Id. at 3. 
8. Id. at 35-36. 
9. Id. at 36. 
10. MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982). 
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political scientist Aaron Wildavsky. In that work, Douglas and Wildavsky rely 
on a typology of cultural worldviews (developed elsewhere by Douglas11) that 
classifies them along two dimensions, “group” and “grid.” 
Figure 1. Douglas’s Culture Typology. 
A “low group” worldview coheres with an individualistic social order, in which 
individuals are expected to secure their own needs without collective 
assistance, and in which individual interests enjoy immunity from regulation 
aimed at securing collective interests. A “high group” worldview, in contrast, 
supports a solidaristic or communitarian social order, in which collective needs 
trump individual initiative, and in which society is expected to secure the 
conditions of individual flourishing.12 A “high grid” worldview favors a 
hierarchical society, in which resources, opportunities, duties, rights, political 
offices and the like are distributed on the basis of conspicuous and largely fixed 
social characteristics—gender, race, class, lineage. A “low grid” worldview 
favors an egalitarian society, one that emphatically denies that social 
characteristics should matter in how resources, opportunities, duties and the 
like are distributed.13 
 
11. MARY DOUGLAS, NATURAL SYMBOLS 54-68 (1970). 
12. See Steve Rayner, Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 83, 87 (S. 
Krimsky & D. Goldin eds., 1992) (stating that “low group” worldviews expect individuals to “fend for 
themselves and therefore tend to be competitive,” whereas “high group” worldviews assume that 
individuals will “interact frequently . . . in a wide range of activities” in which they must “depend on one 
another,” a condition that “promotes values of solidarity”). 
13. See JONATHAN L. GROSS & STEVE RAYNER, MEASURING CULTURE 6 (1985) (stating that the 
“high grid” worldview corresponds to hierarchical society in which resources, opportunities, respect and 
GROUP
GRID
Hierarchist
Egalitarian
Solidarist/CommunitarianIndividualist
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According to Douglas and Wildavsky, individuals select certain risks for 
attention and disregard others in a way that reflects and reinforces the particular 
worldviews to which they adhere. Egalitarians and solidarists are thus naturally 
sensitive to environmental risk, the reduction of which justifies regulating 
commercial activities that are productive of social inequality and that legitimize 
unconstrained self-interest. Individualists predictably dismiss claims of 
environmental risk as specious, in line with their commitment to the autonomy 
of markets and other private orderings. So do hierarchists, who perceive 
warnings of imminent environmental catastrophe as threatening the competence 
of social and governmental elites.14 On its surface, conflict over environmental 
regulation focuses on competing empirical claims of threats and dangers. But 
because the positions people take reflect and reinforce their cultural 
worldviews, disputes over environmental risks are in essence “the product of an 
ongoing debate about the ideal society.”15 
Douglas and Wildavsky offered plausible, if impressionistic, evidence that 
individuals do form risk perceptions congenial to their cultural worldviews, but 
they offer no systematic account of why. In Purity and Danger, Douglas 
ventured a functionalist explanation: Belief that immoral behavior is also 
dangerous “affords a means of supporting the accepted system of morality.”16 
In subsequent works, both Wildavsky17 and Douglas18 have more 
systematically pursued this line of argument, despite the low regard with which 
functionalism is now held in the social sciences generally.19 
But one needn’t be a functionalist to accept the relationship that Douglas 
and Wildavsky posited between risk perception and cultural worldviews. Even 
a hardcore methodological individualist—who insists that all human 
institutions and states of affairs be linked to the decisions of self-interested 
individuals—might expect to see such perceptions arrayed in a culturally 
skewed pattern. Self-interested individuals need to figure out which activities, 
courses of action, and states of affairs promote their interest. Social 
psychology—the second body of research we draw on—suggests that cultural 
values will play a large role in that process.20 
 
the like are “distributed on the basis of explicit public social classifications, such as sex, color, . . . 
holding a bureaucratic office, [or] descent in a senior clan or lineage”); Rayner, supra note 12, at 87 
(stating that the “low grid” worldview favors “an egalitarian state of affairs in which no one is 
prevented from participating in any social role because he or she is the wrong sex, or is too old, or does 
not have the right family connections,” and so forth). 
14. See DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 10, at 99-101. 
15. Id. at 36. 
16. DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 133. 
17. MICHAEL THOMPSON, RICHARD ELLIS & AARON WILDAVSKY, CULTURAL THEORY (1990). 
18. MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK (1986). 
19. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, MAKING SENSE OF MARX 27-28 (1985). 
20. See J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 176-80 (1998) (suggesting 
“ideological” explanations of individual behavior can avoid functionalism through reliance on social 
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Several overlapping psychological mechanisms are likely to induce 
individuals to conform their beliefs about putatively dangerous activities to 
their cultural evaluations of those activities. One is cognitive-dissonance 
avoidance.21 It’s comforting to believe that what’s noble is also benign, and 
what’s base dangerous.22 It’s not comforting—indeed, it’s psychically 
disabling—to entertain beliefs about what’s harmless and what’s harmful that 
force one to renounce commitments and affiliations essential to one’s 
identity.23 
Affect is another mechanism that harnesses factual belief to cultural value. 
Emotions play as large a role in individuals’ perceptions as any other faculty of 
sensation or judgment.24 Perceptions of how harmful activities are, in 
particular, are informed by the visceral reactions those activities trigger. And 
whether those reactions are positive or negative is determined largely by 
cultural values.25 
Finally and most importantly, cultural orientations condition individuals’ 
beliefs about risk through a set of in-group/out-group dynamics. When faced 
with conflicting claims and data, individuals usually aren’t in a position to 
determine for themselves how large particular risks—leukemia from 
contaminated groundwater, domestic attacks by terrorists, transmission of 
AIDS from casual contact with infected gay men—really are. Instead, they 
must rely on those whom they trust to tell them which risk claims are serious 
and which specious. The people they trust, naturally enough, tend to be the 
ones who share their worldviews—and who for that reason are likely biased 
toward one conclusion or another by virtue of forces such as cognitive-
 
psychological mechanisms); Raymond Boudon, Social Mechanisms Without Black Boxes, in SOCIAL 
MECHANISMS: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO SOCIAL THEORY 172 (P. Hedström & R. Swedberg eds., 
1998) (suggesting that social psychological mechanisms make ideological explanations of human 
behavior compatible with “methodological individualism”). 
21. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). 
22. Slovic, for example, has shown that perceptions of risk and benefit for risky technologies are 
always inversely correlated, a finding suggesting that risk perceptions are influenced by cognitive 
dissonance. See, e.g., SLOVIC, supra note 1, at 404-05; see also George A. Akerlof & William T. 
Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1982) 
(suggesting that cognitive dissonance deflates demand of workers to be compensated for accepting 
occupational risks). 
23. See David K. Sherman & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Accepting Threatening Information: Self-
Affirmation and the Reduction of Defensive Biases, 4 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 119, 120 
(2002) (“To the extent that information threatens self-worth, or is presented in a manner that threatens 
self-worth, people may dismiss, deny, or distort in a fashion that serves to sustain their personal feelings 
of adaptiveness and integrity.”); see also Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong: 
Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 
504 (1995) (“[B]elongingness can affect how people process information about nearly all categories of 
stimuli in the social world”). 
24. See generally ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE 
HUMAN BRAIN (1994) (showing that emotions are integral to reasoning, not opposed to it); MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS (2001) (defending a cognitive 
conception that links emotions to cognitive appraisals of different goods and states of affairs). 
25. See SLOVIC, supra note 1, at 405-09. 
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dissonance avoidance and affect.26 
The tendency of individuals to trust only those who share their orientation 
makes the belief-generative power of culture feed on itself. If a particular 
factual position starts out with even slightly more adherents than a competing 
one, arguments in support of that position will necessarily predominate in 
group discussions, making that position more likely to persuade.27 To gain the 
approval of others in the group, moreover, members who even weakly support 
what appears to be the dominant view are likely to express unequivocal support 
for it, while those who disagree will tend to mute their opposition in order to 
avoid censure. This form of “preference falsification”28 will in turn reinforce 
the skewed distribution of arguments, making it even more likely that members 
of the group will be persuaded that the dominant position is correct—indeed, 
indisputably so. 
The phenomenon of group polarization refers to the power of these 
deliberative dynamics to generate homogeneous beliefs within insular groups.29 
The same dynamics necessarily generate conflicting states of opinion across 
insular groups that start out with even weakly opposed states of belief.30 
Our theory of cultural cognition synthesizes these two bodies of research 
and generalizes them. We propose that the various mechanisms of belief 
formation identified by contemporary social psychology are likely to generate 
risk perceptions skewed along cultural lines in the manner posited by Douglas 
and Wildavsky. But we see nothing distinctive about attitudes toward 
environmental protection in this regard. Criminal laws, economic regulation, 
and public health policies all regulate activities that are ripe with culturally 
infused social meanings. The same mechanisms of belief formation—from 
cognitive dissonance avoidance to affect to biased assimilation to group 
polarization—should thus induce individuals to conform their beliefs about the 
empirical efficacy of such policies to their cultural evaluations. As a result, 
 
26. See Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on 
Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 (2003); Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual 
Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naive Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 405, 415 (1995). We emphasize the understandable tendency of 
ordinary individuals to substitute deference to their cultural peers for personal investigation when facts 
are disputed. But the same tendency also characterizes the decisionmaking of individuals who are in a 
position to investigate facts for themselves. Slovic, for example, shows that cultural orientation explains 
variation in the attitudes of trained toxicologists on whether animal studies reliably generate conclusions 
of carcinogen risk. SLOVIC, supra note 1, at 406-09. 
27. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 
89-90 (2000). 
28. See TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1996). 
29. See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 90, 92. 
30. See Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & James Grimmelman, Modeling Facts, Culture, and 
Cognition in the Gun Debate, 18 SOC. JUST. RES. (forthcoming 2005), manuscript available at 
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/documents/modeling_cultural_cognition.pdf. 
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seemingly empirical debates over all manner of public policy will be guided by 
the invisible hands of conflicting cultural worldviews: hierarchic and 
egalitarian, individualistic and solidaristic. 
That in any case, is our theory. We turn next to our evidence. 
III. CULTURAL COGNITION: EVIDENCE 
There are various ways one might test the hypothesis that cultural 
worldviews govern individuals’ beliefs about the efficacy of various policies. 
One fairly straightforward way is to examine the correlations between cultural 
worldviews and such beliefs. There is no reason to believe that empirical 
information is unevenly distributed among hierarchists, egalitarians, 
individualists and solidarists, or that persons of one or another orientation are 
better able to understand such information. Accordingly, if there is a large 
correlation between cultural worldviews and instrumental policy beliefs, and 
that correlation persists even after controlling for other influences, then there is 
strong reason to conclude that individuals are selectively attending to and 
crediting empirical information depending on its congeniality to their 
worldviews. 
Numerous scholars have furnished exactly this sort of proof in connection 
with environmental and technological risk perceptions. From environmental 
pollution31 to nuclear power32 to genetically modified crops33 to ecological 
management techniques34 to drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge,35 
hierarchists and individualists were predictably dismissive of risk claims, and 
egalitarians predictably receptive toward them. 
To test our hypothesis that the phenomenon of cultural cognition 
generalizes to factual conflicts over public policies, we, along with John Gastil 
and Paul Slovic, conducted our own study.36 The sample consisted of a broadly 
 
31. See Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of Contemporary 
Worldviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 61 (1991). 
32. See Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Modeling Stigma: An Empirical Analysis of Nuclear Waste Images 
of Nevada, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA: UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC CHALLENGES TO MODERN SCIENCE 
AND TECHNOLOGY 107 (James Flynn et al. eds., 2001); Claire Marris et al., A Quantitative Test of the 
Cultural Theory of Risk Perceptions: Comparison with the Psychometric Paradigm, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 
635 (1998); Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, The Role of Affect and Worldviews as Orienting Dispositions in 
the Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Power, 26 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1427 (1996). 
33. See Melissa Finucane et al., Gender, Race, and Perceived Risk: The “White Male” Effect, 2 
HEALTH, RISK & SOC’Y 159 (2000). 
34. See Dipak Gyawali, Institutional Forces Behind Water Conflict in the Ganga Plains, 47 
GEOJOURNAL 443 (1999); Wouter Poortinga et al., Environmental Risk Concern and Preferences for 
Energy-Saving Measures, 34 ENV’T & BEHAV. 455 (2002); Linda Steg & Inge Sievers, Cultural Theory 
and Individual Perceptions of Environmental Risks, 32 ENV’T & BEHAV. 250 (2000). 
35. See Eric R.A.N. Smith et al., Trust During an Energy Crisis (Univ. Cal. Energy Inst. Energy 
Policy & Economics Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 006, 2003), 
http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/ucei/Working_Papers/EPE_006.pdf. 
36. The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, National Risk & Culture Survey, 
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representative, nationwide sample of 1800 individuals. Survey questions were 
designed to determine the respondents’ cultural worldviews along the group-
grid dimensions as well as their factual beliefs about a wide range of policy 
issues. We also collected information on pertinent demographic characteristics, 
political attitudes, and personality traits that might plausibly explain variance in 
such beliefs. 
Our results furnished powerful confirmation of the generality of cultural 
cognition. To begin, we were able to replicate the findings of other studies 
investigating the influence of cultural worldviews on environmental and 
technological risks. The more egalitarian and solidaristic individuals were, the 
more concerned they were about global warming, nuclear power, and 
environmental pollution generally; the more hierarchical and individualistic 
they were, the less concerned they were about these asserted dangers. Indeed, 
cultural worldviews predicted individual beliefs about the seriousness of these 
risks more powerfully than any other factor, including gender, race, income, 
education, and political ideology.37 
Even more important, we found the same pattern for a wide range of other 
instrumental policy beliefs. One set related to gun control. Gun-control 
proponents argue that greater restrictions will promote public safety by 
reducing gun violence and accidents,38 while gun-control opponents argue that 
such restrictions will diminish public safety on net by rendering innocent 
persons unable to defend themselves from violent criminals.39 We hypothesized 
that individuals’ cultural worldviews would determine which of these empirical 
claims they accept. Persons of hierarchical and individualistic orientations, we 
surmised, would conclude that gun control has perverse consequences, a belief 
congenial to the association of guns with hierarchical social roles (hunter, 
protector, father) and with hierarchical and individualistic virtues (courage, 
honor, chivalry, self-reliance, prowess). Relatively egalitarian and solidaristic 
individuals, we anticipated, would believe that gun control enhances safety 
because of their association of guns with patriarchy and racism, and with 
distrust and indifference to the well-being of strangers.40 Our results again 
strongly bore out these conclusions. Not only did cultural worldviews have the 
predicted influence on beliefs, they also explained such beliefs more 
powerfully than any other individual characteristic—including whether a 
person was male or female, white or black, urban- or country-dwelling, liberal 
 
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=45 (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2005). 
37. See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 3, at 16-18 & tbl.6. 
38. See, e.g., PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOLENCE: THE REAL COSTS (2000). 
39. See, e.g., JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN-
CONTROL LAWS (2d ed. 2000). 
40. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of 
Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1299-1302 (2003). 
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or conservative.41 
We also established the impact of cultural worldviews on attitudes toward 
the death penalty. Previous studies have found that beliefs in the deterrent 
efficacy of the death penalty are highly correlated with evaluative, largely 
symbolic attitudes toward it.42 We hypothesized that the “group-grid” 
worldviews would capture these divisions. Hierarchists and individualists, we 
anticipated, would believe in the efficacy of the death penalty, the former 
because they see capital punishment as symbolic of deference to authority and 
opposition to social deviance, and the latter because they see it as symbolic of 
the law’s commitment to individual responsibility. Egalitarians and solidarists, 
we predicted, would doubt the efficacy of capital punishment, the former 
because of its association with racial inequality, and the latter because of its 
perceived denigration of society’s responsibility to ameliorate the social 
conditions that generate crime.43 Again, our results strongly confirmed these 
hypotheses.44 
Another set of beliefs concerned the impact of business regulation. 
Unsurprisingly, egalitarians and solidarists perceived business regulation to be 
conducive to economic prosperity, hierarchists and individualists destructive of 
it.45 
We also looked at a number of policy issues on which we expected 
hierarchists to disagree with individualists, and egalitarians to disagree with 
solidarists. One is drug criminalization. Hierarchists and solidarists, we 
predicted, would see street drugs as a serious danger to the well-being of 
society, the former because drugs are emblematic of deviancy, and the latter 
because drug use is associated with irresponsibility and neglect of social 
obligation. Because drug criminalization is likely to symbolize interference 
with individual autonomy for individualists, and racism for egalitarians, we 
surmised that persons of those persuasions would believe that street drugs are 
relatively harmless for society. These predictions, too, were strongly supported 
by our survey data.46 
We also anticipated that hierarchists would square off against individualists 
 
41. See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz supra note 3, at 19-21 & tbl.9. 
42. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close 
Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 116 (1983); Barbara 
Ann Stolz, Congress and Capital Punishment: An Exercise in Symbolic Politics, 5 LAW & POL’Y Q. 157 
(1983); Tom R. Tyler & Renee Weber, Support for the Death Penalty: Instrumental Response to Crime, 
or Symbolic Attitude?, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 21 (1982). 
43. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 439-42 (1999). 
44. See John Gastil, Don Braman, Dan Kahan & Paul Slovic, The “Wildavsky Heuristic”: The 
Cultural Orientation of Mass Political Opinion 19-21 & tbls. 1-3 (Oct. 15, 2005) (unpublished article), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=834264. 
45. See The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, Culture and Political Attitudes, 
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/content/view/91/100/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2005). 
46. See id. 
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and egalitarians on certain public health issues. These included the dangers to 
society of promiscuous sexual behavior. Summoning “[t]he laws of nature . . . 
to sanction the moral code,”47 hierarchists, we imagined, would see deviance of 
this sort as dangerous and worthy of regulatory amelioration. But precisely 
because restrictions on personal sexual behavior tend to connote patriarchal 
norms, we expected egalitarians to view such behavior as relatively harmless. 
We expected the same would be true of individualists, for whom regulation of 
sexual behavior is symbolic of societal interference with individual 
prerogatives generally. Beliefs among our respondents turned out to be 
distributed in exactly this pattern.48 
We also studied beliefs about the health impact of abortion. In her classic 
study, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood, Kristin Luker depicted the 
abortion controversy as a conflict between persons who subscribe to 
hierarchical norms, which confer status upon women who occupy domestic 
roles, and persons who subscribe to egalitarian and individualist norms, which 
confer status upon women and men alike for success in civil society.49 
Consistent with this account, the phenomenon of cultural cognition implies that 
hierarchical women should see abortion as not just morally wrong but 
dangerous to the health of women, a belief that individualist and egalitarian 
women should emphatically reject. This turns out to be true as well, even after 
various other influences—including religion and ideology, race and class—are 
taken into account.50 
However divided Americans might be on the nature of an ideal society, 
there is widespread consensus that securing the material well-being of citizens 
is a proper object of law. Accordingly, reframing culturally fraught issues in 
purely consequentialist terms—ones that avoid explicitly siding with any 
partisan vision of the good—is a familiar impulse for those intent on dissipating 
conflict.51 
The phenomenon of cultural cognition, however, explains why this strategy 
so often fails. Even when citizens of diverse worldviews agree that 
environmental, criminal, economic, and public health policies should all be 
judged by a purely consequentialist standard, their worldviews prevent them 
from agreeing about which policies have the best consequences. 
 
47. DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 3. 
48. See The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, Culture and Political Attitudes, 
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/content/view/91/100/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2005). 
49. KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984). 
50. See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 3, at 23-24 & tbl.12. 
51. See Kahan, supra note 43, at 432-35, 445-48; Martin Rein & Christopher Winship, The 
Dangers of “Strong” Causal Reasoning in Social Policy, 36 SOCIETY 38, 39-40 (1999). 
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IV. CULTURAL COGNITION, CULTURE WARS, AND THE END OF IDEOLOGY 
The role of culture in politics is a topic of immense current interest. In 
sponsoring a host of state referenda to ban gay marriage and announcing its 
support for a federal constitutional amendment to do the same, the Bush 
campaign sought to mobilize its conservative base by pushing cultural issues to 
the forefront in the 2004 presidential election.52 Commentators continue to 
debate how large a role this strategy played in securing Bush’s victory, and 
what the outcome of the 2004 presidential race signifies about the importance 
of cultural values in American politics generally.53 The phenomenon of cultural 
cognition suggests distinctive answers to these questions.54 
Two positions dominate the academic debate over cultural conflict in 
American politics. The “culture war” thesis asserts that such conflict is of 
decisive importance. The prominence of symbolic issues like gay marriage, 
abortion, capital punishment, and gun control reflects the struggle of opposing 
cultural groups to impose a moral orthodoxy through law.55 On this view, 
“culture outweighs economics as a matter of public concern.”56 Indeed, it is by 
deftly aligning themselves with the cultural values of lower middle class 
Americans that Republicans manage to win the support of this constituency 
notwithstanding the party’s support for economic policies that are clearly 
inimical to the interests of these voters.57 
The “end of ideology” thesis, in contrast, treats the appearance of cultural 
conflict in American politics as largely an illusion. “The simple truth,” writes 
Morris Fiorina, “is that there is no culture war in the United States—no battle 
for the soul of America rages, at least none that most Americans are aware 
of.”58 The vast majority of voters hold relatively moderate views on contested 
cultural issues. What’s more, the views they hold are not particularly intense; 
the performance of the economy and other matters that affect their material 
welfare are their main focus.59 The position of the major parties on cultural 
 
52. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, “Moral Values” Carried Bush, Rove Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 
2004, at A20. 
53. See, e.g., Symposium, Culture War in America: Myth or Reality?, 3 FORUM: J. APPLIED RES. 
CONTEMP. POL. (2005), http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol3/iss2/. 
54. Gastil, Braman, Kahan & Slovic, supra note 44, at 27-28. 
55. See, e.g., JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 
(1991). 
56. THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? 6 (2004) 
57. See generally id. (developing this thesis to explain the appeal of the Republican Party in 
economically disadvantaged regions of the United States). 
58. MORRIS P. FIORINA, CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA 7-8 (2005). 
59. Many news media outlets identified “moral values” as the primary concern of voters in the 
2004 election. However, a Pew Research Center poll of 1209 such voters found that the disposition of 
voters to identify moral values as the most important factor in their decision was extremely sensitive to 
question wording, and that in fact 57% of voters identified either “Iraq” (22%), “Economy/Jobs” (21%), 
or “Terrorism” (14%) as the most important factor when those choices were offered as alternatives to 
“moral values” (27%). See Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Voters Liked Campaign 2004, 
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issues is of consequence to only a relatively small group of intensely partisan 
and highly sophisticated voters. The concerns of these more zealous 
constituencies assume a misleadingly central appearance in electoral politics as 
a whole only because such groups are disproportionately vocal, and because the 
material-minded, non-ideological masses are evenly split in their party 
allegiances.60 
The phenomenon of cultural cognition suggests that both of these positions 
are wrong. The “end of ideology” thesis grossly understates the role that culture 
plays in organizing mass, and not just fringe, political opinion in the United 
States. But the “culture war” thesis just as decisively misunderstands the way in 
which cultural values figure in mass politics. 
To make these points concrete, is useful to start with a broader puzzle in 
political science: How do ordinary citizens form their political opinions?61 For 
most citizens, the intricacies of national policy are far less important, and 
occupy far less of their time, than the day-to-day goings on of their jobs, the 
details of their social and family lives, and even the current performance of 
their local professional sports teams.62 Not surprisingly, a considerable body of 
political science research shows that neither party affiliation nor ideology 
predict mass opinion very well; those characteristics are strong predictors only 
for highly sophisticated individuals who devote relatively large amounts of 
time to collecting information on political issues.63 These findings are in fact 
central to the case of those who espouse the “end of ideology” thesis. But it’s 
clearly not the case that policy positions and candidate preferences are 
randomly distributed across the mass of citizens. If ideology and party 
affiliation aren’t imposing a coherent shape on mass opinion, what is? 
The answer, we suggest, is cultural cognition. Here we draw again on 
Wildavsky, who hypothesized that “group-grid” worldviews are substantially 
more productive fonts of mass opinion than conventional political ideologies.64 
Most citizens, he recognized, don’t have the capacity to derive concrete 
positions from the abstractions comprised by “liberalism” and 
“conservativism.” Nor do they have the time to identify, and attend to the 
leadership of, more politically sophisticated and ideologically attuned elites. 
But most citizens do have a vivid sense of the values that inhere in hierarchy, 
 
but Too Much “Mud-Slinging,” Nov. 11, 2004, http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?-
ReportID=233. 
60. FIORINA, supra note 58, at 37-38, 114. 
61. See PAUL M. SNIDERMAN ET AL., REASONING AND CHOICE: EXPLORATIONS IN POLITICAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 15-16 (1991). 
62. See JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 6-7, 16 (1992). 
63. See id. 84-89; MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW 
ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 254-61 (1996). 
64. See Aaron Wildavsky, Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of 
Preference Formation, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (1987). 
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egalitarianism, individualism and solidarism, which are woven into ordinary 
citizens’ everyday life activities. It often will be possible, Wildavsky argued, 
for citizens to chart which policy positions cohere with, and which candidates 
adhere to, their cultural worldviews. But even more important, worldviews 
furnish ordinary citizens with a surfeit of readily accessible cues to guide their 
political preferences: the advice of culturally like-minded associates, the 
directives of leadership figures clearly invested with cultural authority, the line 
espoused by culturally-affiliated organs of mass opinion. In effect, worldview-
congeniality operates as a powerful heuristic for identifying which positions to 
espouse or denounce, and which candidates to endorse or oppose.65 
The data from our cultural worldview study again furnishes support for this 
position. Our cultural worldview scales were much stronger predictors of 
opinions on environmental issues, crime control issues, and economic 
regulatory issues than were ideological and party affiliation measures. In fact, 
on most of these matters—consistent with existing political science literature—
ideology and party affiliation predicted the opinion only of respondents who 
possessed a relatively high degree of political sophistication. In contrast, 
cultural worldviews were able to predict policy positions for all respondents, 
including the most politically unsophisticated ones.66 Consistent with 
Wildavsky’s hypothesis, cultural worldview does indeed appear to systematize 
political opinions for the mass of citizens. 
This conclusion spells trouble for the “end of ideology” thesis. Cultural 
values clearly do generate major divisions of opinion on a range of issues—not 
just among partisans or elites, but also among moderate citizens of meager 
political sophistication. The “end of ideology” thesis relies heavily on evidence 
that the vast majority of citizens are not strongly ideological in their opinions. 
But that just shows that the ideologies, as conventionally measured, are a bad 
proxy for cultural worldviews, not that cultural worldviews are politically inert. 
At the same time, cultural cognition does little to vindicate the “culture 
war” thesis. That position sees American politics as dominated by illiberal 
jockeying among opposing cultural groups bent on capturing the expressive 
capital of law. Nothing in the cultural cognition theory entails that picture of 
American politics. Instead, the phenomenon of cultural cognition explains how 
citizens whose only concern is their material well-being, narrowly understood, 
are still likely to array themselves into opposing cultural factions on political 
maters. Again, citizens aren’t in a position to figure out for themselves what 
economic, crime-control, environmental or national security policies advance 
their material interests. Accordingly, citizens must defer to the opinion of 
persons whom they believe are knowledgeable and share their interests to tell 
 
65. See id. at 6-13. 
66. Gastil, Braman, Kahan & Slovic, supra note 44, at 20-21 & tbl.4. 
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them which policies and candidates to support.67 And the persons to whom 
citizens attribute these attributes, unsurprisingly, are the ones who share their 
cultural worldviews, and who, as a result of the various mechanisms of cultural 
cognition, are likely to be slanted toward one particular policy position or 
candidate. 
In sum, cultural values don’t motivate mass political opinion, as the 
“culture war” thesis imagines. They merely orient it through a complex set of 
interrelated social and cognitive mechanisms. The paradoxical result is the 
cultural polarization of even relatively nonpartisan and tolerant citizens whose 
most pressing political concern is to identify which policies and which party 
will best help them make ends meet. 
So did Bush win in 2004 because he was the candidate who shared most 
citizens’ cultural values or because he was the candidate whom citizens thought 
would best promote their material interests? The answer is both: The vast 
majority of citizens who voted for Bush perceived that doing so would advance 
their interests; and they believed this because they imputed competence, shared 
interest, and trustworthiness to Bush as a result of his (and the Republican 
Party’s) stances on cultural issues. Yet insofar as cultural values only orient 
rather than motivate citizens, most of his supporters probably won’t care if 
Bush now pushes culture to the back burner (as he already has on gay 
marriage),68 and attends only to economics and national securityso long as 
those policies also cohere with his supporters’ cultural worldviews. 
V. FROM HEURISTIC TO BIAS 
Public disagreement about the consequences of law is not just a puzzle to 
be explained but a problem to be solved. The prospects for enlightened 
democratic decisionmaking obviously depend on some reliable mechanism for 
resolving such disputes and resolving them accurately. Because such 
disagreements turn on empirical claims that admit of scientific investigation, 
the conventional prescription is the pursuit and dissemination of scientifically 
sound information.69 
 
67. See Arthur Lupia, Who Can Persuade Whom? Implications from the Nexus of Psychology and 
Rational Choice Theory, in THINKING ABOUT POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 51 (James H. Kuklinski ed., 
2002). 
68. Jim VandeHei & Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Says Election Ratified Iraq Policy, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 16, 2005, at A1 (“Bush said he will not press senators to pass a constitutional amendment banning 
same-sex marriage, the top priority for many social conservative groups.”). 
69. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” 
Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1296 (2003) (“Over time, a body of empirical research can 
disentangle thorny issues of causation and lead toward consensus.”); Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, 
Fact-Free Gun Policy?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1329, 1337 (2003) (“[C]ulture clearly matters for public 
opinion about gun policy in America, but there is also room for empirical analysis to affect policy 
development, not only through its influence on public opinion, but also through its direct influence on 
judges, regulatory agencies, and legislators.”). 
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The hope that democracy can be enlightened in such a straightforward 
manner, however, turns out to be an idle one. Like most heuristics, cultural 
cognition is also a bias. By virtue of the power that cultural cognition exerts 
over belief formation, public dispute can be expected to persist on questions 
like the deterrent effect of capital punishment, the danger posed by global 
warming, the utility or futility of gun control, and the like, even after the truth 
of the matter has been conclusively established. 
Imagine—very counterfactually70—that all citizens are perfect Bayesians. 
That is, whenever they are apprised of reliable information, they readily update 
their prior factual beliefs in a manner that appropriately integrates this new 
information with all existing information at their disposal.71 Even under these 
circumstances, conclusive discovery of the truth is no guarantee that citizens 
will converge on true beliefs about the consequences of contested public 
policies. For while Bayesianism tells individuals what to do with relevant and 
reliable information, it doesn’t tell them when they should regard information 
as relevant and reliable. Individuals can be expected to give dispositive 
empirical information the weight that it is due in a rational-decisionmaking 
calculus only if they recognize sound information when they see it. 
The phenomenon of cultural cognition suggests they won’t. The same 
psychological and social processes that induce individuals to form factual 
beliefs consistent with their cultural orientation will also prevent them from 
perceiving contrary empirical data to be credible. Cognitive-dissonance 
avoidance will steel individuals to resist empirical data that either threatens 
practices they revere or bolsters ones they despise, particularly when accepting 
such data would force them to disagree with individuals they respect. The 
cultural judgments embedded in affect will speak more authoritatively than 
contrary data as individuals gauge what practices are dangerous and what 
practices are not. And the culturally partisan foundation of trust will make them 
dismiss contrary data as unreliable if they perceive that it originates from 
persons who don’t harbor their own cultural commitments. 
This picture is borne out by additional well-established psychological and 
social mechanisms. One constraint on the disposition of individuals to accept 
empirical evidence that contradicts their culturally conditioned beliefs is the 
phenomenon of biased assimilation.72 This phenomenon refers to the tendency 
of individuals to condition their acceptance of new information as reliable 
based on its conformity to their prior beliefs. This disposition to reject 
 
70. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman 
et al. eds., 1982) (documenting numerous departures from rationality in human decisionmaking). 
71. See generally HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS (1968) (developing the Bayesian model 
for how to integrate information and probabilistic judgments in making decisions under conditions of 
uncertainty). 
72. See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior 
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979). 
CULTURAL COGNITION 9 (EE REVIEW COMPLETE).DOC 11/14/2005 2:51 PM 
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 24:147, 2006 
164 
empirical data that contradict one’s prior belief (for example, that the death 
penalty does or doesn’t deter crime) is likely to be especially pronounced when 
that belief is strongly connected to an individual’s cultural identity, for then the 
forces of cognitive dissonance avoidance that explain biased assimilation are 
likely to be most strongly aroused.73 
Two additional mechanisms reinforce the tendency to see new information 
as unreliable when it challenges a culturally congenial belief. The first is naïve 
realism. This phenomenon refers to the disposition of individuals to view the 
factual beliefs that predominate in their own cultural group as the product of 
“objective” assessment, and to attribute the contrary factual beliefs of their 
cultural and ideological adversaries to the biasing influence of their 
worldviews. Under these conditions, evidence of the truth will never travel 
across the boundary line that separates a factually enlightened cultural group 
from a factually benighted one. Indeed, far from being admitted entry, the truth 
will be held up at the border precisely because it originates from an alien 
cultural destination. The second mechanism that constrains societal 
transmission of truth—reactive devaluation—is the tendency of individuals 
who belong to a group to dismiss the persuasiveness of evidence proffered by 
their adversaries in settings of intergroup conflict.74 
We have been focusing on the impact of cultural cognition as a bias in the 
public’s recognition of empirically sound information. But it would be a 
mistake to infer that the immunity of social and natural scientists to such bias 
improves the prospects for truth, once discovered, to penetrate public debate. 
This would be a mistake, first, because scientists aren’t immune to the 
dynamics we have identified.75 Like everyone else, scientists (quite 
understandably, even rationally) rely heavily on their priors when evaluating 
the reliability of new information. In one ingenious study, for example, 
scientists were asked to judge the experimental and statistical methods of what 
was represented to be a real study of the phenomenon of ESP. Those who 
received the version of the fictitious study that found evidence of ESP rated the 
methods to be low in quality, whereas those who received the version that 
found no evidence of ESP rated the methods to be high in quality, even though 
the methods were in fact independent of the conclusion.76 Other studies 
showing that cultural worldviews explain variance in risk perceptions not just 
 
73. See id. at 2108 (“If our study demonstrates anything, it surely demonstrates that social scientists 
can not expect rationality, enlightenment, and consensus about policy to emerge from their attempts to 
furnish ‘objective’ data about burning social issues.”). 
74. See Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 27 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995). 
75. See Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research Results, 49 ANN. 
REV. PSYCHOL. 259 (1998). 
76. See Jonathan J. Kohler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments, 56 ORG. BEHAV. 
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 28 (1993). 
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among lay persons but also among scientists who specialize in risk evaluation77 
fortify the conclusion that for scientists, too, cultural cognition operates as an 
information-processing filter. 
But second and more important, any special resistance scientists might have 
to the biasing effect of cultural cognition is beside the point. The issue is 
whether the discovery and dissemination of empirically sound information can, 
on its own, be expected to protect democratic policymaking from the distorting 
effect of culturally polarized beliefs among citizens and their representatives. 
Again (for the umpteenth time), ordinary citizens aren’t in a position to 
determine for themselves whether this or that scientific study of the impact of 
gun control laws, of the deterrent effect of the death penalty, of the threat posed 
by global warming, et cetera, is sound. Scientific consensus, when it exists, 
determines beliefs in society at large only by virtue of social norms and 
practices that endow scientists with deference-compelling authority on the 
issues to which they speak. When they address matters that have no particular 
cultural valence within the group-grid matrix—What are the relative water-
repellant qualities of different synthetic fabrics? Has Fermat’s Last Theorem 
been solved?—the operation of these norms and practices is unremarkable and 
essentially invisible. 
But when scientists speak to policy issues that are culturally disputed, then 
their truth-certifying credentials are necessarily put on trial. For many citizens, 
men and women in white lab coats speak with less authority than (mostly) men 
and women in black frocks. And even those who believe the scientists will still 
have to choose which scientists to believe. The laws of probability, not to 
mention the professional incentives toward contrarianism,78 assure that even in 
the face of widespread professional consensus there will be outliers.79 Citizens 
(again!) lack the capacity to decide for themselves whose work has more merit. 
They have no choice but to defer to those whom they trust to tell them which 
scientists to believe. And the people they trust are inevitably the ones whose 
cultural values they share, and who are inclined to credit or dismiss scientific 
evidence based on its conformity to their cultural priors. 
These arguments are necessarily interpretative and conjectural.80 But in the 
spirit of (casual) empirical verification, we invite those who are skeptical to 
perform this thought experiment. Ask yourself whether you think there is any 
credible scientific ground for believing that global warming is/isn’t a serious 
threat; that the death penalty does/doesn’t deter; that gun control does/doesn’t 
 
77. See, e.g., SLOVIC, supra note 1, at 406. 
78. See ROBERT K. MERTON, Priorities in Scientific Discovery, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 
283-324 (1973). 
79. See DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 10, at 49-66. 
80. They are developed more systematically, with the aid of computer simulations, in Braman, 
Kahan & Grimmelman, supra note 30. 
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reduce violent crime; that abortion is/isn’t safer than childbirth. If you believe 
the truth has been established on any one of these issues, ask yourself why it 
hasn’t dispelled public disagreement. If you catch yourself speculating about 
the possible hidden cognitive motivations the disbelievers might have by virtue 
of their cultural commitments, you may proceed to the next Part of this Essay 
(although not until you’ve reflected on why you think you know the truth and 
whether your cultural commitments might have anything to do with that 
belief).81 If, in contrast, you are tempted to answer, “Because the information 
isn’t accessible to members of the public,” then please go back to the beginning 
of this Essay and start over. 
VI. OVERCOMING CULTURAL BIAS: IDENTITY AFFIRMATION 
Nothing in our account implies either that there is no truth of the matter on 
disputed empirical policy issues or that the public cannot be made receptive to 
that truth. Like at least some other cognitive biases, cultural cognition can be 
counteracted. 
As we’ve argued, factual disputes over gun control, the death penalty, 
environmental regulation and like issues derive from individuals’ resistance to 
accepting information that threatens their cultural commitments. It follows that 
individuals are likely to resist factual information less if it can be presented in 
forms that affirm rather than denigrate their values. Experimental research 
shows that where individuals feel self-affirmed they are indeed more open to 
reconsidering their beliefs on culturally contested issues, including the death 
penalty and abortion.82 Policymakers can harness this identity-affirmation 
effect by designing policies that are sufficiently rich in their social meanings to 
affirm the values of persons of diverse cultural worldviews simultaneously. 
Consider two historical examples. The first concerns the success of abortion 
reform in France. Decades-long conflict on that issue was quieted by a policy 
that conditioned abortion on an unreviewable certification of personal 
“distress.”83 That policy made it possible for both religious traditionalists, who 
interpreted certification as symbolizing the sanctity of life, and egalitarians and 
individualists, who interpreted unreviewability as affirming the autonomy of 
women, to see their commitments affirmed by the law.84 
 
81. Cf. Robinson et al., supra note 26, at 405 (suggesting that individuals more readily recognize 
rationalization and group influence on beliefs of others than on their own beliefs). 
82. See Geoffrey L. Cohen et al., When Beliefs Yield to Evidence: Reducing Biased Evaluation by 
Affirming the Self, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1151 (2000); Sherman & Cohen, supra 
note 23; Geoffrey L. Cohen et al., Bridging the Partisan Divide: Self-Affirmation Reduces Ideological 
Closed-Mindedness and Inflexibility (Oct. 16, 2005) (unpublished article), 
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/documents/cohen_self_affirmation_draft.pdf. 
83. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 15 (1987). 
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Thereafter, France enacted a set of policies involving counseling and 
enhanced social support for single mothers, measures that in fact reduce the 
abortion rate.85 The evidence that such policies would work in exactly this way 
existed before adoption of France’s abortion reform law. But it was not until 
after the law succeeded in achieving a measure of expressive convergence that 
the two sides trusted one another to believe the evidence and give this 
consequentialist solution a try.86 
The second example concerns the emergence of political consensus in favor 
of tradeable emissions permits as a means of regulating air pollution in the late 
1980s and early 1990s.87 Because such permits involve a market mechanism for 
controlling pollution, this regulatory strategy vindicated individualists’ belief 
that private orderings conduce to societal well-being. Hierarchists could also 
feel affirmed by a policy that promised to empower rather than constrain 
powerful commercial firms. Shown a solution that affirmed rather than 
threatened their identities, it thus became easier for persons of these 
persuasions to accept that air pollution was a problem to begin with. At the 
same time, because this policy was aimed at improving air quality, egalitarians 
and solidarists could see its adoption as recognizing their view of the dangers 
of unconstrained commerce and industry. The affirmation of their values thus 
made it easier for them to accept evidence that uniform, centrally enforced air 
quality standards don’t work.88 
Now consider two prospective applications of identity affirmation for 
neutralizing cultural bias. Recently, certain ideologically diverse groups have 
started to tout renewed investment in nuclear power as a way to reduce the 
greenhouse gas emissions primarily responsible for global warming.89 The self-
affirmation effect suggests why this proposal might actually change minds, 
both about the dangers of global climate change and about the risks of nuclear 
energy. Individualists and hierarchists both support nuclear power, which is 
emblematic of the very cultural values that are threatened by society’s 
recognition of the global warming threat. Shown a solution that affirms their 
identities, individualists and hierarchists, as in the case of tradeable emission 
permits, can be expected to display less resistance—not just politically, but 
cognitively—to the proposition that global warming is a problem after all. 
 
85. See GLENDON, supra note 83, at 18, 53-55. 
86. See id. 
87. See A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID RAIN PROGRAM 
13-30 (2000) (recounting emergence of consensus in response to efforts of the first Bush Administration 
to deflect charges of insufficient commitment to the environment). 
88. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: OR HOW THE 
CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS 
AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1981). 
89. See Craig Gilbert, Vice President Calls for Support of Nuclear Power Plants as Way to Reduce 
Global Warming, MILWAUKEE J.-SENT., June 14, 2001, at 16A; Nicholas D. Kristof, Nukes Are Green, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2005, at A19. 
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Likewise, when egalitarians and solidarists are exposed to the same 
information, they are likely to perceive nuclear power to be less dangerous: The 
affirmation of their identity associated with the recognition of global warming 
threat lowers the cultural status cost of accepting information about nuclear 
safety that they have long resisted. 
A second of use of identity affirmation involves gun control. We propose 
that states offer a “bounty,” in the form of a tax rebate or other monetary 
reward, for individuals who register handguns. A bounty of this sort would 
affirm the cultural identities of both gun-control supporters and gun-control 
opponents simultaneously because both could see it as an effective and fair 
solution to a collective action problem—even without agreeing what that 
problem is! For gun-control supporters, the relevant collective good is public 
safety, which registration promotes by making it easier to trace the ownership 
of weapons used to commit crimes. In line with egalitarian and solidarist 
sensibilities, control supporters can thus envision the bounty as a means of 
equitably compensating individuals for contributing to society’s collective 
welfare. For gun-control opponents, in contrast, the relevant public good is the 
reduction of violent crime in a community in which a relatively high proportion 
of individuals own guns. Because they don’t believe individuals should be 
expected to endure disproportionate burdens to benefit society at large, 
individualists will think it’s perfectly appropriate to compensate individual gun 
owners for the contribution they are making to public safety generally. So will 
hierarchists, who can see the bounty as a fitting public acknowledgement of the 
virtuous willingness of gun owners to promote the common good.90 
Again, the benefit of such a policy consists less in the effect it has on risky 
behavior than the impact it has in removing cultural impediments to the 
acceptance of facts about risk. Any policy that affirms the identities of 
culturally diverse citizens simultaneously should make all of them more 
receptive to information that they might otherwise have found to be lacking in 
credibility. We don’t know (be honest: do you?) whether more guns lead to 
more crime or less. But we are certain that members of the American public 
won’t converge on the truth of the matter on this or other culturally contested 
issues unless policymakers succeed in framing their proposals in terms 
congenial to citizens of diverse cultural persuasions. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this Essay, we have attempted to solve a puzzle: What explains public 
 
90. For an elaboration of this proposal and others aimed at resolving the cultural impasse over guns 
in American society, see Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of 
Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 54 EMORY L.J. 
(forthcoming 2006), manuscript available at http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/documents/ 
Overcoming_fear_cultural_politics.pdf. 
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disagreement over the consequences of law? The answer, we have suggested, 
has less to do with differences in knowledge than differences in values. The 
phenomenon of cultural cognition refers to a series of interlocking social and 
psychological mechanisms that induce individuals to conform their factual 
beliefs about contested policies to their cultural evaluations of the activities 
subject to regulation. As a result, individuals of diverse cultural worldviews 
form highly divergent factual beliefs about which policies will ameliorate 
sources of societal distress and which will merely compound them. Moreover, 
because cultural cognition determines what sorts of information individuals 
find reliable, culturally polarized beliefs of this sort stubbornly persist in the 
face of scientific advances in understanding. 
This solution to the puzzle of empirical policy disagreement generates a 
paradox. The prospects for democracy are obviously dim among a society of 
individuals zealously intent on securing political endorsement of their own 
partisan view of the good. But it turns out that the prospects are not inestimably 
brighter in a society whose members’ only political concern is to secure their 
collective material well-being. For even if such individuals renounce the 
ambition to impose their own worldviews on one another, their conflicting 
values will continue to drive them into persistent and bitter opposition as they 
attend in common to their most mundane needs. 
This paradox gives rise to a dilemma. If the alliance of modern science and 
liberal political ideals can’t assure effective and pluralistic self-government, 
what can? 
Our prescription, counterintuitively, is a more unabashedly cultural style of 
democratic policymaking. Those interested in helping citizens to converge in 
support of empirically sound policies—on guns, on the environment, on crime 
control, on national security—should focus less on facts and more on social 
meaning. It’s only when they perceive that a policy bears a social meaning 
congenial to their cultural values that citizens become receptive to sound 
empirical evidence about what consequences that policy will have. It’s 
therefore essential to devise policies that can bear acceptable social meanings 
to citizens of diverse cultural persuasions simultaneously. Because culture is 
cognitive prior to facts in the policy disputes, culture must be politically prior 
to facts too. 
While the strategies we’ve described for counteracting cultural cognition as 
bias are based on the best research available, our account of how to work 
through rather than against cultural cognition is admittedly ad hoc. The 
psychological mechanisms that we’ve described merit more detailed 
evaluation, and the counter-biasing strategies we’ve advanced call for 
additional empirical testing in both the lab and the field. But we believe that 
what we’ve already discovered about the relationship between cultural values 
and political preferences makes one conclusion abundantly clear: that 
CULTURAL COGNITION 9 (EE REVIEW COMPLETE).DOC 11/14/2005 2:51 PM 
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 24:147, 2006 
170 
democracy needs scientific knowledge of what laws say every bit as much as it 
needs scientific knowledge of what laws do. 
